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SYMPOSIUM
TEACHING AND TESTING FOR COMPETENCE
IN LAW SCHOOLS
ROBERT KEETON*
I. COMBINING ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
A. The Dual Role of Law Schools
Law schools in the United States are typically both academic and
professional. Most law schools are university-related, treasuring their
ties to traditions of learning and inquiry. At the same time, they
conceive it as one of their missions to contribute to the preparation of
students who expect to be practising lawyers.
B. Academic Education and Competence
Centering pre-admission legal education in university-related law
schools has detached it from its earlier mooring in law office reading
and apprenticeship. Association with a university underscores the
objective that the basic educational preparation for careers in the legal
profession be, first, more systematic than the vagaries that any set of
clients' interests and concerns are likely to present to an apprentice;
second, more reflective than instruction is likely to be in competition
with the demands of a busy law office; and, third, richer in variety of
both content and perspective than a single mentor or law firm would be
likely to offer. Detachment from the immediate contacts of law offices
with the worlds of business and government provides some insulation
for uninhibited, reflective inquiry out of which may emerge deeper
understandings of law and all the institutions and relations it affects.
* B.B.A. 1940, L.L.B. 1941, University of Texas; S.J.D. 1956, Harvard University.
Currently United States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts. Formerly
Langdell Professor of Law at Harvard University and Director of the National Institute
for Trial Advocacy.
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These positive gains from treating the study of law as an academic
discipline reinforce rather than conflict with a law school's professional
mission. Educational experience in a protected academic setting - far
from being tangential to or in conflict with preparation for a career in
practice - is indeed the ideal basic educational preparation for a
professional career in law. Stated another way, the point is that a sound
basic education in law is essential to the competence of a lawyer. To the
extent that we can define, teach, and test for the acquisition of that
basic education, we can define, teach, and test for something that is
essential to competence. On this much, consensus exists not only among
academicians but surely more broadly in the legal profession as well.
Before we examine more closely the nature of a sound basic
education in law and its relation to competence, consider first the
nature of elements of competence.
II. ELEMENTS OF COMPETENCE
A. Knowledge of Theory and Doctrine; Skills of
Understanding and Application
One way of thinking about elements of competence for the practice
of law is to see them as falling generally into two broad categories -
knowledge and skills. Each of these categories is subject to further
division, and at least in some contexts it is useful to distinguish
knowledge of doctrine from knowledge of theory and to distinguish
skills of understanding (including the skills of legal analysis) from skills
of application such as interviewing, counseling, negotiating, drafting,
and persuading. These four categories - knowledge of theory, know-
ledge of doctrine, skills of understanding, and skills of application -
may be viewed as a continuum moving from a strong orientation toward
theory on the one hand to a strong orientation toward practical
application on the other.
Even though the emphasis of legal education may be placed
elsewhere, it is probably agreed that at least a basic minimum of
knowledge of theoretical foundations of law is an important element of
professional competence - of immensely practical use in many contexts
of professional performance. Sharp differences emerge quickly when
discussion turns to priorities of emphasis on the theoretical and
practical, but rarely is it disputed that a good understanding of
theoretical foundations bf basic legal doctrine is an essential element of
competence to represent clients effectively.
Knowledge of basic doctrine is also an agreed aim of education in
law schools, and a recognized element of competence. Differences
emerge, however, as inquiry extends to identifying and defining more
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particularly the knowledge that is essential to competency. One kind of
difference concerns the elusive meaning of "knowing." What do we
mean when we speak of "knowing theory," or "knowing doctrine," or
"knowing law"? Can one "know" a body of law without "understanding"
why it came to be as it is, on the one hand, and how it applies in the
solution of practical problems, on the other hand? For example, does one
"know" the law of products liability when one is able to state a general
rule of strict liability but unable to articulate supporting moral theories
of accountability or supporting economic theories of resource allocation
and risk management? Or, from a contrasting perspective, does one
"know" the law of products liability when one is able to state both a
general rule of strict liability and supporting moral and economic
theories but unable to formulate instruction that will serve to guide
judges and juries in deciding individual controversies so as to produce a
total set of evenhanded dispositions? Or, from a similar perspective,
does one "know" the basic law of contract and property when one is able
to recite the central theories of enforceable promises and ownership of
things and yet unable to determine whether an exculpatory clause in a
residential lease, between identified persons in particularized circum-
stances, is legally enforceable or not? Or - in a comparison starting at
a point already removed somewhat farther from theory toward applica-
tion - does one "know" the law of self-defense in criminal cases when
one is able to recite rules and standards as they have been stated by
legislatures in statutes, by judges in appellate opinions, and by writers
in articles or texts, but unable to formulate statements that might be
included in a charge to the jury, or an argument of counsel, correctly
applying those rules to disputed evidence in a particular case and
explaining, so a jury can understand them, the different outcomes the
jury might reach, depending upon their resolution of disputed facts?
It is an essential part of "knowing," in a profound sense, that one
"understand" the "known" body of law well enough to be able to draw
upon those parts of it that are relevant to a problem of practical affairs
and to use them in addressing the problem. One comes to greater
understanding of stated rules of self-defense, for example, by testing
their application, observing the legal outcomes they command in varied
fact situations, and reflecting on the consistency of those outcomes with
moral values that might be asserted as part of the foundations of the
law of self-defense. With that greater understanding, one becomes
better prepared - more nearly competent - to distinguish a case
argued as precedent, or to draft a proposed statutory reform. Thus the
more profound knowledge is closely associated with skills such as
persuading and drafting. Indeed, our drawing a line, for our own
analytic purposes, between knowledge and the ability to use knowledge
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is an artificial separation, even if nonetheless useful. The source of its
usefulness is that human minds are incapable of grasping the whole
truth at once and may be aided by provisional separations that allow us
to apply our limited intellect to manageable bits of the whole. We are
inevitably in peril of forgetting that the separation is not the reality but
instead an abstraction invented by human minds, to be used as an aid to
comprehension and not as an object of fealty. But if we can remember
the nature of this separation and remain receptive to reexamining it
from other perspectives, observing a two-fold distinction between
knowledge and skills - or a four-fold distinction among knowledge of
theory, knowledge of doctrine, skills of understanding (including legal
analysis), and skills of application - may contribute to our inquiry into
the requisites of competence.
Speaking of "observing" this distinction reflects another hypothesis
that it may be useful to make explicit. Even though the formulation of
distinctions such as these is the product of the mind, one's assertion of
observing the distinctions is an appeal to others to accept the
distinctions as consistent with their own observations. Even if we
cannot entirely disentangle knowledge and skills at points where they
intertwine, we can see the difference clearly at points farther outward.
We understand in a general way, at least, what one means when saying
that a student knows much of a given body of law - both theory and
doctrine - and may even be good at legal analysis, but has not yet
acquired the skills of application needed for a type of law practice that
depends in part on that body of law.
Basic knowledge, then, is part of what is required for competence -
but only part. One who has acquired all the knowledge and understand-
ing that we commonly associate with a sound basic education in law
may yet be unprepared to function as a lawyer, even in the least
demanding of lawyer roles. Skills also are essential. On this, too,
academicians and practising lawyers generally agree, even while
differing sharply, both as groups and individually, about whether
helping novices across the bridges between the academic discipline and
practical applications should be primarily, if not exclusively, a responsi-
bility of law schools or of the bar.
B. Knowledge, General and Special
A mark of professional performance is that it always occurs within
the bounds of some professional role. Most professional roles leave
ample room for distinctive individual performance, but bounds there
are, and the competent professional must know them. To be competent
for the legal profession, moreover, one must know the bounds of not a
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single role but many. This knowledge and, indeed, understanding of the
differing constraints and freedoms of different roles that the lawyer may
occupy in different contexts is a part of the general knowledge that
every lawyer must have to be competent. The lawyer who does not know
the demands and constraints of undertaking to draft a contract between
two persons, though with their consent, is likely to encounter unfore-
seen trouble in the minefields of conflicting interests. Such a lawyer is
unprepared to perform professionally in the context. So too is the lawyer
who undertakes the role of advocate in an adversary proceeding, or
counselor, or negotiator, without understanding that always the lawyer
is performing in a role that carries demands and constraints different
from those one experiences when acting for oneself. Qualities such as
integrity, industry, and reliability are necessary conditions for profes-
sionally responsible performance, but they are not sufficient. The
lawyer must have basic knowledge of the legal system and of the
differing constraints and freedoms associated with the varied roles the
lawyer may undertake within that system. This is a part of the general
knowledge that is essential to competence.
Other parts of the essential general knowledge extend to all the
basic doctrines of the legal system within which the lawyer practices -
in Anglo-American systems, the staples of contract, tort, property,
criminal law, procedure, and constitutional law at least, and probably
taxation, corporations, administrative law, commercial law, and evi-
dence as well. No doubt many readers will have their own favorite
candidates for addition to this core list of subject matter about which
every lawyer should know the basics.
All this general knowledge, however, is only a part of the
knowledge required for competence to undertake a particular profes-
sional assignment or to undertake assignments regularly in a defined
area of practice. To be prepared for particular assignments one must
have at the outset, or have the means of acquiring when needed, a great
deal more knowledge specialized to the problem or the area within
which it falls.
C. General Skills of Understanding
The skills needed for competence to undertake an identified
professional assignment plainly will vary with the assignment. Can we,
however, identify some skills that every member of the legal profession
should have developed to at least a minimum degree of proficiency? The
answer is surely yes.
At the least, every competent lawyer has developed what may be
usefully classified as general skills of understanding - skills of
analysis, learning, and communication.
1981]
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Skills and Analysis. One type of analysis - commonly referred to
as legal analysis - has been referred to already. Distinguishable,
though closely related, is the skill of factual analysis. The relationship
between the two is extraordinarily close because the distinguishing
features of a good factual analysis serve as the distinguishable
conditions to which a good legal analysis may attach different outcomes
for good reasons.
Skills of Learning. Throughout their professional careers, compe-
tent lawyers must continue to learn in order to stand still rather than
falling back professionally in the face of changing law and changing
contexts, and the more so to advance professionally. Mastering ways of
learning efficiently and effectively, and developing the capability and
practice of using them, are essentials that every competent lawyer must
have developed to at least a minimum degree.
Skills of Communicating. Lawyers' work is largely, though not
exclusively, verbal. Skills of writing, speaking, listening, and reading
are basic essentials of competency.
D. Special Skills of Application
Just as special knowledge beyond the core of basic knowledge of law
and the legal system is essential to most professional assignments, so
too individual professional assignments are likely to require one or
more special skills, such as interviewing, counseling, drafting, negotiat-
ing, and persuading. Whether or not some minimal proficiency in these
skills is regarded as a basic requirement for competency, substantial
proficiency in one or more of these special skills will be essential to
effective representation of clients in many particular contexts.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and state codes
fashioned after it all base some rules of conduct on the principle that a
lawyer should not undertake an assignment unless the lawyer is
competent to complete it or expects to have become competent or to
engage a competent associate when the need arises.' Very little help is
available in the literature, however, for one who wishes to understand
what is required for competence. In no other context is this absence of
effective guidance more noticeable than in relation to the need for skills
beyond basic skills of analysis, learning, and communication.
The outline appearing immediately below is a suggested structure
for identifying and describing the elements of competence for undertak-
ing an assignment as a trial lawyer.2
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101 A(IM and EC 6-1 (1969).
2. See generally Report and Tentative Recommendations of the Committee to
Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in the Federal Courts to the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 79 F.R.D. 187 (1978).
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Basic
Standards of Competence for Trial Counsel Generally
1. Knowledge of
a. Rules of evidence
b. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
c. Basic substantive law
d. Specialized substantive law relevant to the case
e. Local rules
2. Ability to
a. Investigate and direct investigation of facts
b. Analyze factual issues and proof
c. Analyze legal issues
d. Draft court papers
e. Prepare written briefs
f. Present oral arguments on motions
g. Evaluate claims and advise clients regarding settlement
h. Conduct negotiations for settlement
i. Develop a comprehensive trial plan
3. Character
a. Integrity
b. Industry in preparing adequately for assignments under-
taken
c. Professional reliability (compliance with standards of profes-
sional conduct)
Additional
Standards in Competence for Trial Counsel in
Testimonial Civil Proceedings
1. Knowledge of
f. Rules of civil procedure
g. Law of jurisdiction and venue in civil cases
2. Ability to
j. Sense human relationships and reactions
k. Examine witnesses
1. Cross-examine witnesses
m. Present arguments to the jury
n. Prepare requests for instructions and objections to the charge
1981]
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Additional
Standards of Competence for Trial Counsel in
Criminal Proceedings
1. Knowledge of
f. Rules of criminal procedure
g. Law of criminal jurisdiction
h. Substantive and procedural criminal law generally
2. Ability to
j. Sense human relationships and reactions
k. Examine witnesses
1. Cross-examine witnesses
m. Present arguments to the jury
n. Prepare requests for instructions and objections to the charge
Even if Part II of this summary is taken as a generally acceptable
identification of the skills required for competency in trial advocacy, of
course it will not serve for other roles in which skills of interviewing,
counseling, negotiation, and drafting are more important and skills of
persuasion somewhat less important than in trial advocacy. Also, a
teacher who sets out to define these skills more precisely and to design
ways of teaching and testing for their development is embarking on an
undertaking the nature of which is barely suggested here. Even so,
perhaps this outline will serve the purpose of suggesting the general
nature and scope of the work to be done if one is to seriously address
issues of teaching and testing for the full range of skills required for
competency in practice.
III. ELEMENTS OF COMPETENCE IN TRADITIONAL
LAW SCHOOL EDUCATION
A. Emphasis on Doctrine and Analysis
Education in law schools has tended to focus primarily on two
central elements of competence among the four broad elements identi-
fied in Part II of this article; it has focused on knowledge of legal
doctrine and skills of legal analysis, with less attention to underlying
theory on the one hand and to skills of application on the other.
The emphasis on knowledge of legal doctrine is attested by the
organization of the traditional curriculum of law schools and the names
given to courses, most of which identify segments of legal doctrine. The
emphasis on legal analysis is attested by the common assertion -
somewhat at odds with the organization and nomenclature of the
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curriculum - that law schools are more concerned with training
students to think as lawyers and judges think, or as they should think,
than with filling student minds with knowledge of the law. Probably it
is some form of skill of legal analysis that is most often in the mind of
the speaker who makes this common observation about emphasis on
training students to think.
Perhaps some readers will object to classifying training in thinking
as training in a skill. Certainly it is an element of competence easily
distinguishable from skills such as interviewing, counseling, negotiat-
ing, drafting, and persuading, and one who so prefers may give it a
name other than skill. But it is even more sharply distinguishable from
knowledge, and in the present discussion, it is referred to as a general
skill of understanding - one that it is essential to develop in some
minimum degree before any bridges can be crossed between knowing
law and using it in addressing a problem.
There are, of course, degrees and degrees of the depth of training in
probing analysis. Methods of instruction centering almost exclusively on
the study of appellate opinions tend strongly to emphasize a special kind
of analysis - rigorously probing analysis of legal doctrine as developed
in the common law case-by-case judicial elaboration of reasons for
decision. As other methods of instruction are introduced, many other
kinds of analysis, legal and factual, may become centers of attention.
Whether the subject of probing be judicial opinions or instead some
other form of exposition, analysis that probes deeply enough exposes
premises of reasoning and invites critique of those premises by
whatever standards of evaluation the critic may advance. Premises of
legal reasoning are inevitably to some extent value-laden, and so are
the critic's standards of evaluation. One of the skills of a good teacher is
the skill of leading students through probing that is deep enough for
them to recognize not only the key values implicit in a body of law but
also the key values implicit in their own standards of evaluation of that
body of law.
Skills of analysis - legal and factual - lead to a skill of exposing
the value implications of choice. Perhaps it overstates the point to call it
a skill of moral analysis, but it is at least a skill of developing a better
informed basis for choice that inevitably has value implications.
The common assertion that moral values cannot be taught in law
schools - or elsewhere to persons as mature as law students - misses
the point that moral dilemmas cannot be answered well, or even
recognized for what they are, without the application of the knowledge
and analysis that makes the difference between blind choice and
informed choice.
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Why has education in law schools tended to emphasize only the
middle of the spectrum - legal doctrine and legal analysis? Why do law
schools give less attention to theoretical foundations on the one hand
and practical applications on the other? An easy answer is that this
emphasis reflects the priorities of interest among law teachers. The
unexpressed but rather apparent innuendo is that one having both the
power and the will to change priorities in law schools need only change
the criteria for selection, promotion, and tenure of law teachers. On
closer examination, however, this answer seems unpersuasive.
Criticisms of the two-fold emphasis on legal doctrine and legal
analysis come from diametrically opposed perspectives. One set of
criticisms charges that law schools give inadequate attention to
foundations of legal doctrine in moral, social, economic, political, and
philosophic theory. Another set (voiced mostly by an entirely different
group of critics) charges that law schools give inadequate attention to
the practical applications of law to life problems. It is most unlikely that
it would be possible to advance the objectives of both sets of critics by a
single set of teacher qualifications applied uniformly to all teaching
appointments. Few if any potential appointees have such broad and
balanced qualifications and interests. A more promising avenue for
achieving what one conceives to be a better balance among potential
emphases is to aim for diversity among different members of the faculty.
It is true that this point need not be seen as a challenge to the assertion
that a change of emphasis in legal education could be achieved merely
by a change in personnel policies. No doubt greater diversity of
emphasis could be achieved by deliberately aiming in faculty appoint-
ments for greater diversity of qualifications and interests among
different members of the faculty, without attempting to make such
diverse interests a condition of each appointment. Achieving greater
diversity in this way seems a worthy aim.
A second observation, however, seems inconsistent with the asser-
tion that the priorities of emphasis in law school could be easily
changed, over the long run, by merely changing appointments criteria.
A more persuasive case can be made for the proposition that some basic
characteristics of law and education have tended to produce emphasis on
legal doctrine and legal analysis and over time would tend to do so
again even in the face of a dramatic attempt to change appointments
criteria.
In the first place, legal doctrine and legal analysis are more easily
comprehended, defined, taught, learned, and tested than either the
theoretical foundations or the practical applications. Indeed, the consen-
sus that we can teach and test for mastery of legal doctrine and legal
analysis is so powerful that demands for evaluation and proof of claims
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of the effectiveness of an educational program - voiced with vigor in
recent years in relation to proposals for new educational programs
oriented toward practical application - are rarely directed toward those
parts of law school curricula that focus primarily upon legal doctrine
and legal analysis.
Even in the face of this strong consensus on the effectiveness of law
schools in teaching and testing for competence in legal analysis, as well
as knowledge of legal doctrine, one may feel uneasy about whether the
competence in legal analysis that our tests disclose may not be a
competence dependent more on inherent ability and earlier training
than on what happens to students after they enter law school. Of course,
legal analysis depends on knowledge of legal doctrine, mostly acquired
by law students after they enter law school. For this reason, students
are unable to show proficiency in legal analysis until they have
acquired a certain body of legal knowledge. But to infer that law schools
have also contributed to development of greater skills of analysis than
those the students had upon entry is largely a leap of faith. Indeed, the
strong correlations between Law School Admission Test scores and
performance in law school examinations might be read as suggesting
that the skill of analysis is not merely present in latent form but instead
already developed when students take the LSAT.
We have more reason for confidence, then, that we know how to test
for the skill of legal analysis than that we know how to teach it.
A second reason that current pre-bar-admission legal education
tends to emphasize legal doctrine and legal analysis is that it is
centered in university-related law schools. Inherently this relationship
tends to produce less emphasis on practical application than occurred
when pre-bar-admission legal education was located primarily in law
offices. The gains of locating basic education in law in university-related
schools plainly outweigh the risk of inadequate attention to practical
application, but they do not justify inattention to avoiding that risk - a
point to which Part VI of this article returns.
Locating legal education in university-related schools creates a
climate favorable to appropriate emphasis on the theoretical founda-
tions of law. Any inadequacy of emphasis on this element of competence
must have its source elsewhere, and the most likely source is the
inherent difficulty of the subject. Probably even those law teachers of
core curriculum subjects who give more than average emphasis to basic
theory in their course instruction tend to give tests that do not faithfully
reflect that emphasis. Part of the explanation, surely, is that law
teachers tend to have greater confidence in their evaluation of answers
to doctrinal and analytic questions than in their evaluations of answers
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to questions having a stronger theoretical orientation. Since students
are acute observers of what to expect on examinations and tend to
allocate their priorities of study consistently with their observations,
the law teacher's theoretical emphasis tends not to be reflected in study
when it is not reflected in examinations.
In summary, emphasis on legal doctrine and legal analysis comes
naturally. If basic education in law, conducted in law schools, is to give
substantial emphasis also either to theoretical foundations or to
practical applications, this balance must be achieved by deliberate
choice and by continued attention to maintaining the broader, more
diverse curriculum.
B. General and Specialized Knowledge
What knowledge of law should law schools try to teach? The
answers one hears both inside and outside law schools reflect some
ambivalence on this subject. On the one hand, it is said that legal
doctrine will change over the time period during which a lawyer
practices, little of what one learns in law school will be remembered
when needed, and it is easy and essential to go to the library and find
the up-to-date doctrine when needed; for these reasons, it is said, the
doctrine taught in law school is less important than the legal method.
On the other hand, course titles in typical law school curricula convey a
message of emphasis on doctrine rather than method. They suggest a
progression from the most basic bodies of doctrine (such as contracts,
property, torts, criminal law, and procedure) through a second level of
doctrine still generally regarded as basic (such as constitutional law,
corporations, *taxation, commercial law, administrative law, and evi-
dence) to more advanced and specialized subjects that are mostly
elective and are treated, in law school and bar examination require-
ments and in faculty advice as beyond the core of basic education in law
that every student should have acquired before entering practice. The
general knowledge of the first and probably also the second of these
levels of progression in law study seems essential to competence for
practice in virtually any field of law.
The general knowledge acquired in a sound basic education in law
is, however, only part of the knowledge required for competence to
undertake a particular professional assignment or to undertake assign-
ments regularly in a defined area of practice. Even though it is useful
for a student to be exposed to some specialized bodies of doctrine ("to
sink a few deep shafts" by way of example as well as for their intrinsic
worth) still it would be unrealistic to aim for teaching each student in
law school all the bodies of specialized knowledge the student might
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later need for competence during years of practice, extending far into
the future. The needs could not be accurately foreseen, and in any event
their scope would be beyond reach. This point helps to account for the
general view among law teachers that they are more concerned with
teaching the basic principles of an area of law than with teaching
details of current doctrine that may have been modified by the time the
student confronts a problem of practice in that area.
Although some specialized knowledge might be taught and learned
in law schools, in general, the specialized knowledge required for
competence either in special assignments or in defined areas of practice
must be acquired after the basic education has been completed. Indeed,
continued competence will require continued acquisition of specialized
knowledge throughout one's years of professional performance. If law
schools continue to make a significant contribution to teaching special-
ized knowledge, they must do so by offerings beyond the J.D.
curriculum.
C. Teaching and Testing for Skills
Three basic general skills of understanding are identified in Part II
of this article - skills of analysis, skills of learning, and skills of
communicating.
Traditional law school education, as already noted, emphasizes
skills of legal analysis both in classrooms and in examinations. Skills of
factual analysis receive some, though plainly less, attention in instruc-
tion, and less still in testing.
Leading students through a process of legal analysis and evaluation
of the legal analyses of others is a first step toward another goal of a
sound basic education in law - to develop in students the skill and the
inclination to engage in such probing analysis when the teacher is no
longer around to guide it. The hope is that by observing a model of
probing analysis presented by the teacher and by participating directly
or vicariously in the application of that model not only to the writings of
others but also to their own or other students' standards of evaluation,
the students are learning to learn.
Skills of learning have received less explicit attention in law
schools than skills of analysis. Increased interest in clinical education
has tended, however, to focus increased attention on the importance of
learning how to learn and the importance of developing and nurturing
good habits of learning. This emphasis arises naturally from recognition
that the scope of the experience any particular student may have while
in law school, and more especially while in a single course in law school,
is so limited that the lessons to be derived from that experience will be
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of relatively little value unless the student is learning something about
experience more generally. Perhaps the most valuable thing to be
learned is learning how to learn from the experience of the future.
A good experience-based course will help students learn, first, how
to evaluate performances of others, second, how to evaluate their own
performances and, third, how to improve their own performances. It is
useful to make these goals explicit and to communicate them to
students. A good critique of a student performance serves not only its
intrinsic purpose of telling that student what in the performance was
good and why, and what could be improved and how, but also a second
purpose - as a model for other students in the class of elements of
evaluating a performance they have just observed.
The most compelling testimony of the value of law school courses
that focus on skills training is the student evaluation that describes
such a course as a transforming experience. The student emerges from
the course with a sense of being a different person, performing in some
typical role in a distinctively different way at the beginning and end of
the course. When that sense has been developed in the student, very
likely it will carry with it both an improved capacity to learn from the
experience of the future and a strong inclination to use that capacity
rather than allowing it to lie fallow.
The third set of general skills of understanding - skills of
communicating effectively - come into operation only upon a founda-
tion of at least a basic level of understanding acquired through use of
the skills of analysis and learning. From another perspective, however,
skills of communicating are essential to effective analysis and learning
and are thus as basic as these latter two skills.
A recurring problem for law teachers (though certainly not unique
to teachers of law) is the difficulty, both in the teacher's own work and
in the guidance of student learning, of cutting through barriers of
communication and the misunderstandings that flow from them. First
year instruction in law is sometimes described as remedial reading. The
point extends as well to writing, even if taught only indirectly and
incidentally, and the more clearly when writing exercises are assigned
and criticisms and evaluations are returned to the student. And the
point extends to spoken as well as written communications.
The kind of instruction that is referred to as remedial in character
is aimed at clarity and precision. Though essentials, these are only two
among a larger number of characteristics of the skillful communications
of a competent lawyer, who must also master, among others, techniques
of persuasion and accommodation (including, on appropriate occasions,
deliberate and perhaps even creative ambiguity).
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Although law schools have traditionally done much to help students
improve the clarity and precision of their written and spoken com-
munications, their record is less impressive with respect to other aspects
of communication skills. One reason, no doubt, is the higher unit cost of
instruction aimed, for example, at improving writing style. A second,
and perhaps even more basic reason, is the greater difficulty of defining
the elements of competence in writing style - or in other aspects of
communication skills apart from clarity and precision. Moreover, even if
definition can be agreed upon, there are greater difficulties in teaching
and testing for elements of competence such as writing style.
The problems of defining elements of competence and of developing
effective techniques and methods of teaching and testing are probably
even greater as we move from the general skills of analyzing, learning,
and communicating to special lawyer skills such as interviewing,
counseling, drafting, negotiating, and persuading.
Only the last of these - and only in the contexts of litigation,
primarily in trial and appellate courts - has received moderately
large-scale attention in law schools. Probably this development, too,
reflects not simply what happened to be the priorities of interest among
law faculties but instead reflects in part the greater ease of defining the
skills essential to competence and of designing programs to teach and
test for those skills in the highly structured context of trial and
appellate advocacy than in the more amorphous contexts of less
rule-bound settings.
IV. METHODS OF TEACHING
The main core of law school instruction may still be appropriately
described as one or another among many varieties of case-method
instruction. The main focus is on rigorous analysis of cases or problems.
In several ways, however, law school instructional techniques have
been changing substantially. In the 1970's in comparison with the
1920's, for example, or even the 1950's, the focus of rigorous analysis
has been more heavily on policy implications and less heavily on
applying or distinguishing doctrinal precedents. Also, fewer teachers
are using Socratic techniques, in less demanding forms, and for lower
percentages of their total instructional time. Two independent pressures
probably account for much of this change in technique. One is doctrinal.
The enormous growth in the total body of judicial opinions, statutes, and
other relevant materials creates a pressure toward lecturing because of
the inherently slower pace of subject matter coverage in class discus-
sions. The second pressure is sociological; students have been more
resistant and less responsive to traditional discussion techniques than
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were the classes of earlier student generations. One may agree that both
these causes of change should be taken into account in a rational
evaluation of teaching methods and yet be skeptical that the law faculty
response has been ideal. The wiser response to a massive increase in
materials may be greater selectivity rather than more coverage, and
student resistance to discussion techniques may be grounded more in
reaction to particular techniques than to all techniques involving a class
in active discussion rather than making them passive listeners. Also,
students are less likely to resist involvement when they understand a
teacher's motivation for involving them - the belief that they will learn
more in this way - and find the teacher openly willing to discuss with
them this teaching-learning hypothesis and the techniques the teacher
uses in trying to teach consistently with it.
In pursuit of a more thoughtful evaluation of methods and
techniques of instruction, it may be useful to step back and observe the
whole range of ways of teaching and their relation to ways of learning.
One way of classifying teaching-learning techniques for law study
identifies five main categories: (1) exposition, (2) demonstration, (3)
discussion, (4) supervised simulation, and (5) supervised practice.3
The learning outcome of a teaching-learning exercise depends
heavily on the intensity of the students' concentration of interest and
energy throughout the period of the exercise. Levels of intensity of
interest and energy tend to be lowest in the passive roles of listening to
or reading expositions, somewhat higher in the passive roles of hearing
or seeing demonstrations, and increasingly higher when students are
involved in discussion, supervised simulation, or supervised representa-
tion of clients in dealing with live problems.
This observation alone raises the red flag of warning that a trend
toward more lecturing in law school classes may be ill-advised.
A second reason for concern about a trend toward more lecturing is
that narrowing the range of techniques of teaching may reinforce the
inherent tendency to emphasize only those things the teacher is more
likely to engage in with confidence in lectures - exposition of legal
doctrine and exposition or demonstration of legal analysis.
Skills training - even for the general skills of analyzing, learning,
and communicating, and more so for skills of application such as
interviewing, counseling, drafting, negotiating, and persuading - is
likely to fail if the teaching is almost entirely in the form of exposition
3. See Keeton, A Framework for Thinking About Law-Related Learning in QuAI.rrY
LEGAL SERVICES AND CONTINUING LEGAi. EDUCATION, 27-39 (1975).
[VOL. 40
TEACHING AND TESTING
and never proceeds beyond demonstration into techniques that involve
students in active rather than passive participation in class sessions.
Objections are raised to techniques of supervised simulation and
supervised practice on grounds of unit cost. Team teaching in which law
schools draw heavily upon volunteers from the bench and the bar,
participating in a team organized and directed by a full-time or
part-time member of the law school faculty, can bring costs into a range
comparable to that for small classes and seminars, as well as enriching
the teaching capabilities by reason of the greater diversity of experience
and talent represented in a good teaching team. The potentialities of
such team teaching methods have been illustrated both in the sessions
of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy, which depends almost
exclusively on supervised simulation, and in law school clinical courses
that use team teaching in courses integrating both supervised simula-
tion and supervised practice. They have been illustrated, as well,
through less extensively, in clinical components of law school courses in
contexts other than trial and appellate advocacy - contexts of
interviewing, counseling, negotiating, and drafting.
Computer-aided exercises, though not as promising as team
teaching in providing effective supervised simulation at reasonable cost,
may also make a contribution in this way. A well-designed computer-
aided exercise may place the student in a lawyer's role, receive student
responses, evaluate them within constraints concerned with the compu-
ter capability of reading responses, and collect for the instructor's
evaluation responses that the computer cannot evaluate. The branching
capabilities of computer programs offer opportunities for tailoring the
progression of the exercise to the student's responses. The timing
capabilities - the fact that the computer can be otherwise usefully
occupied while the student at a given terminal takes as long as needed
to think through a problem before responding - offer opportunities for
pacing exercises in accordance with the student's state of progression in
knowledge and skill.4
V. METHODS OF TESTING
Mastery of doctrinal knowledge and of the skill of legal analysis are
most commonly tested in law schools by problem questions, stating key
assumptions of fact and calling for essay answers that in most schools
are evaluated by the faculty member teaching the course. The concern
of law faculties about the difficulty of fairly evaluating student answers
4. See generally R. BURRIS, R. KEETON, C. LANDIS & R. PARK, TEACHING LAW WITH
COMPUTERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (1979).
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is underscored by persistence in performing the onerous task of grading
rather than assigning it to assistants.
Large classes produce a pressure toward use of "objective" questions
the answers to which can be mechanically graded. Even these "objec-
tive" examinations tend to be problem oriented and aimed at testing the
skill of legal analysis as well as knowledge of a body of doctrine.
Because of the extraordinary difficulty of avoiding unintended ambi-
guities as well as excluding the influence of subjective factors on both
the student responses and the evaluation standards on which the
grading guide is based, "objective" examinations tend to be less flexible
and, in the view of most law teachers, generally less satisfactory
instruments of examination than problem questions calling for essay
answers that are graded by the teacher of the course.
The teacher's evaluation of essay answers necessarily involves
judgments that cannot be entirely objective, even though the aim and
determination are to make them evenhanded. Law teachers believe, in
general, in their capability of making these judgments fairly on
questions testing doctrinal knowledge and legal analysis. Their confi-
dence probably diminishes substantially as the subject of examination
moves toward a stronger theoretical orientation. Plainly, confidence
diminishes rapidly as the subject moves in the opposite direction, from a
central focus on doctrinal knowledge and legal analysis toward examin-
ing other skills - even skills of writing, and more so as to skills of
application.
Lack of confidence in standards of evaluating skills, in either oral
or written performances, surely does not go as deep, however, as concern
about recognizing the different elements and qualities that account for
quite different levels of performance. The greater concerns go to using
in this context as many levels of refinement of evaluation as one may
confidently use in evaluating legal analysis, and in identifying and
describing the elements of the performance that account for the
evaluation.
Even though evaluation of skills exercises (apart from legal
analysis) probably cannot be as nearly objective and as finely calibrated,
with confidence, as evaluation of essay answers to questions calling for
a display of doctrinal knowledge and legal analysis, it seems reasonably
clear that useful evaluations can be made. Indeed, effective skills
training in simulated exercises in trial advocacy has depended heavily
on diagnosis by members of the teaching team, explanation to the
student of that diagnosis, explanation and demonstration of better ways
of performing, and new efforts by the student to perform in one of the
better ways in a second effort, either on the same exercise or some new
exercise requiring the same skill.
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When called upon to do so, members of such a trial advocacy
teaching team are able also, with considerable confidence, to add to
these discursive and explanatory evaluations an overall comparative
evaluation - a numeral or letter grade, or a categorization such as
excellent, good, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. It is plainly more
difficult, however, to devise "objective" tests for skills of application
than for demonstrations of knowledge and legal analysis. In the present
state of the art, we must expect both higher cost in human resources
and lower confidence in results when testing skills than when testing
knowledge and legal analysis.
VI. AIMS FOR THE FUTURE
Should law schools aim for a balance of emphasis different from the
traditional heavy focus on knowledge of legal doctrine and skill of legal
analysis? Can law schools expect to succeed, and will the effort be worth
the cost, if they try to offer more skills training in the relatively
neglected skills of learning from experience and communicating, and
also in special skills of application such as persuading, interviewing,
counseling, drafting, and negotiating?
The potential gains are substantial.
The most obvious and direct gain is the benefit to students in
helping them bridge the gap between traditional basic legal education
and practice. Developments in the legal profession, including the
pressures toward higher entering compensation and quicker absorption
into active client representation offer less rather than more promise
that effective bridging will occur in the future in that kind of law office
supervision that is aimed substantially at instruction as well as getting
on with the work at hand. Moreover, helping neophytes bridge this gap
is essentially an instructional problem. Law offices are even less likely
than law schools to practice effective skills instruction without con-
sciously setting out to do so and commiting substantial energies and
resources to the task.
The bridging need not be attempted by practising lawyers alone nor
by law teachers alone. The most promising possibilities are those
involving all branches of the legal profession in the effort. It seems more
likely that such a joint effort can be successfully mounted in law schools
than anywhere else among our legal institutions. Moreover, to return to
a theme asserted at the outset of this article, instruction in skills, along
with legal education more generally, should be more systematic than
the vagaries of any set of clients' interests and concerns are likely to
present to an apprentice, more reflective than instruction is likely to be
in competition with the demands of a busy law office, and richer in
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variety of both content and perspective than a single mentor or law firm
would be likely to offer.
It is tempting, always, to conclude that the things we are most
confident we can do are the things it is most important that we do. If
law schools yield to this temptation, they will continue to emphasize
teaching and testing for knowledge of legal doctrine and skills of legal
analysis. That emphasis will be changed - corrected, if one agrees that
it is too narrow - only by conscious choice and continued vigilance
against falling back to what we can do most easily and most confidently.
